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THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE LEGAL
CERTAINTY TEST: THE NEED FOR

CONSISTENCY AMONG FEDERAL COURTS
WHEN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT-INCONTROVERSY
INTRODUCTION
For the federal courts,jurisdiction is not automatic and cannot be
presumed. Thus, the presumption in each instance is that a federal court
lacks jurisdiction until it can be shown that a specific grant ofjurisdiction
applies. Federalcourts may exercise only that judicial power provided by
the Constitution in Article III and conferred by Congress. All other
judicialpower orjurisdictionis reserved to the states. And
although
plaintiffs may urge otherwise, it seems settled that federal courts may
assume only that portion of the Article III judicialpower which Congress,
by statute, entrusts to them. Simply stated, Congress may impart as much
or as little of the judicialpower as it deems appropriateand the Judiciary
may not thereafteron its own motion recur to the Article III storehousefor
additionaljurisdiction. When it comes to jurisdictionof the federal courts,
truly, to paraphrasethe scripture, the Congress giveth, and the Congress
takethawav.1
As former District Court Judge John Sirica confirmed in his
famous 1973 Watergate opinion, the limited jurisdiction of federal courts in
the United States is a fundamental element of our judicial system.2 Indeed,
a plaintiff may only bring a lawsuit in federal court if the cause of action
satisfies the jurisdictional limitations of the Constitution and any further
Congressional restrictions.3 First, a plaintiff may bring a claim in federal
court if the cause of action arises "under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their

I

Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55
(D.D.C. 1973).
2 See id. (discussing limited jurisdiction of federal courts and prerequisites to jurisdiction).
3 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 2.1-2.6, (4th ed. 2003)
(discussing constitutional and statutory limits on federal jurisdiction).
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Authority."4 Second, if the plaintiffs cause of action does not arise under
federal law but is against a citizen of a different state, he may bring his suit
in federal court under diversity jurisdiction.5 In diversity cases, Congress
has further limited the jurisdiction of federal courts by enacting 28 U.S.C. §
1332, which grants federal courts original jurisdiction 6in diversity cases
only if the dispute exceeds a monetary threshold amount.
Although Congress established a jurisdictional threshold, it did not
establish statutory guidelines for determining when the monetary
requirement is satisfied, and therefore judicial interpretation has guided
federal courts' determination of the amount in controversy.7 In St. Paul
Mercury Indemnity Company v. Red Cab Company,8 the Supreme Court
announced the "legal certainty" test, holding that "the sum claimed by the
plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith" and that
"[i]t must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the
jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal." 9 Since the Red Cab decision,
federal courts have split as to what courts may consider when determining
if the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.10 Circuit
courts that follow the minority approach have applied Red Cab strictly,

4 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I (granting original jurisdiction to federal courts in federal
question actions).
See id. (authorizing federal courts to hear cases "between Citizens of different States").
Courts have interpreted this jurisdictional grant to require complete diversity between the parties,
so that all plaintiffs must be from different states than all defendants when a case is brought on
diversity grounds. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806) (announcing "complete
diversity" requirement for diversity jurisdiction).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (establishing threshold amount in controversy for federal
diversity jurisdiction). Congress originally set the jurisdictional threshold amount at $500.
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79. Congress has periodically increased the
amount in controversy requirement because of inflation. See, e.g.. Act of March 3, 1911 § 24, 36
Stat. 1087, 1091 (S3000); Act of July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415 ($10,000); Judicial Improvements
and Access to Justice Act § 201, 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988) ($50,000). In 1996, it raised the
amount in controversy requirement from $50,000 to S75,000, which is the current jurisdictional
threshold. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 § 205, 110 Stat. 3847-3850. See also Jordan
F. Miller Corp. v. Mid-Continent Aircraft Serv., Inc., No. 98-5104, 1999 WL 164955, at *3 (10th
Cir. March 24, 1999) ("We recognize that the legislative history of § 1332(b) demonstrates an
intent to deter plaintiffs from filing cases in federal court when the amount in controversy is, or is
likely to be, less than the jurisdictional amount.").
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (establishing no guidelines for determining amount in
controversy).
303 U.S. 283 (1938).
Id. at 288-89 (establishing "legal certainty" test for diversity jurisdiction).
I0 See Adams v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000)
(asserting "open-ended prayer for recovery . . . is not an allegation that diversity jurisdiction
); see also Jimenez-Puig v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 574 F.2d 37. 40 (Ist Cir. 1978)
exists ....
(holding plaintiffs claim not controlling when, viewed objectively, could not exceed
jurisdictional amount).
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holding that only the plaintiffs good faith claim controls."
Under the
majority approach, however, circuit courts have held that courts sitting in
diversity may look beyond the pleadings to determine whether subject

matter jurisdiction is present.' 2

To date, the Supreme Court has not

resolved this split, and therefore a lawsuit that could be heard in one circuit
on diversity grounds could be dismissed in another circuit for want of
jurisdiction. 13

This Note will argue that a limited application of the majority
approach is the sound analytical method for determining whether the
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. 4 Part I will
examine the historical interpretation of the amount in controversy
requirement, focusing on attempts by the Supreme Court to establish
guidelines for lower federal courts to follow. 15 Part II will discuss the
competing applications of the Red Cab standard, and the inconsistency
inherent in the circuit court split. 16 Part III will argue that a limited
application of the majority rule is the logical solution to resolving the
current split among the circuits. 7 Specifically, this Note will argue that
where subject matter jurisdiction depends on the court's determination of
the enforceability of a state statutory or contractual limitation on damages,
federal courts sitting in diversity should dismiss these cases for want of
jurisdiction." In all other cases, the Red Cab standard should control, and
federal courts should not consider other defenses to defeat diversity
I See Ochoa v. Interbrew Am., Inc., 999 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to consider
valid defense disclosed in complaint when determining if amount in controversy satisfied); see
also Anderson v. Moorer, 372 F.2d 747, 750 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding res judicata defense could
not defeat diversity jurisdiction). In this regard, some federal courts have refused to consider the
validity of state laws that, if upheld, would limit recovery below the jurisdictional threshold. See
Crawford v. Martin Marietta Corp., 622 F.2d 339, 341 (8th Cir. 1980) ("federal courts are not to
overrule settled state law and predict that a state court would do so without strong indications
from the state itself").
12 See Pratt Cent. Park Ltd. P'ship v. Dames & Moore, Inc., 60 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir. 1995)
(dismissing diversity case on grounds that contractual clause limited recovery to $5000); see also
Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 195, 209 (3d Cir. 1995) (dismissing diversity case
because contract provision limited recovery to $50,000).
13 Compare Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., 802 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir.
1986) (affirming dismissal of diversity suit for want of jurisdiction because statute limited
recovery to $750), with Zacharia v. Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 684 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 1982)
(refusing to consider affirmative defense that statute limited recovery to $1000 for jurisdictional
determination).
14 See Pratt Cent., 60 F.3d at 354 (affirming dismissal where contractual clause limited
plaintiff's recovery below jurisdictional threshold).
15 See iniraPart I (discussing evolution of amount in controversy requirement).
'1, See infta Part II (analyzing competing applications of Red Cab
standard).
17 See infra Part III (proposing solution to current circuit court split).
is See infra Part III (arguing interpretations of state law should be left to state courts).
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jurisdiction.' 9 Ultimately, this Note will advocate that adopting this limited
application of the majority rule would resolve the split among the courts
and eliminate the inconsistent outcomes of diversity actions in the circuit
courts.2 °

I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMOUNT IN
CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT
The United States Constitution contains no requirement that
diversity cases exceed a minimum monetary threshold. 21 The expansive
jurisdictional grants conferred in Article III, § 2 of the Constitution,
however, established the outer boundaries of federal court jurisdiction, and
Article III, § 1 granted Congress the power to narrow the reach of that
jurisdiction.22 Indeed, Congress has limited the jurisdiction of federal
courts sitting in diversity by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1332 ("Section 1332").23
While it is not entirely apparent from the legislative history of
Section 1332, the conventional rationale for its enactment was to allow
foreign plaintiffs access to a forum that would be free of the potential
prejudice of state courts.24 Congress did not intend to grant an unlimited
right of access, however, and thus included additional restrictions in the
diversity statute. 25 This Note focuses on one such limitation-the amount
in controversy threshold that a plaintiff must satisfy to invoke diversity
jurisdiction.26
19 See Ochoa v. Interbrew Am., Inc., 999 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1993) (refusing to consider
valid defense disclosed in complaint in determining whether amount in controversy satisfied); see
also Anderson v. Moorer, 372 F.2d 747, 750 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding res judicata defense could
not defeat diversity jurisdiction).
20 See Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 195, 204 (3d Cir. 1995) (dismissing
diversity case where liability clause limited recovery below jurisdictional threshold).
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (authorizing federal courts to hear cases "between Citizens
of different States").
22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (establishing federal judiciary "in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish").
23 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (establishing requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction).
24 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 142 (5th ed. 1994) (discussing

purpose of Section 1332); see also Henry Jacob Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REV. 483, 487-91 (1928) (discussing alternate justifications for
diversity jurisdiction).
25 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (defining amount in controversy and diversity of
citizenship); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (2006) (allowing district court to deny costs to plaintiff if actual
recovery is less than threshold amount); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2006) (defining corporate and legal
representative of estate citizenship for purpose of establishing diversity); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)
(2006) (establishing diversity requirements for class actions).
26 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2005) (establishing threshold amount in controversy for federal
diversity jurisdiction).
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Since the enactment of Section 1332, and specifically the inclusion
of an amount in controversy requirement, scholars have promulgated
numerous bases for its existence.17 The early prevailing view was that
Congress wanted to ensure that out-of-state plaintiffs could not subject
defendants to suit in distant forums for insignificant claims. 28 A more
modem and perhaps more practical justification for the monetary
2
requirement is to maintain a manageable caseload in the federal courts. 1
The inability of the parties to waive subject matter jurisdiction may provide
additional support for this latter explanation.30
Subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental tenet of the American
judicial system, and its significance is reflected in the fact that either of the
litigating parties may raise the issue or a court may raise it sua sponte.31 In
diversity cases, however, whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is not
always clear from the pleadings or even during the early stages of trial.For instance, the state citizenship of a litigating party may be unclear,
which could defeat the complete diversity requirement established in
Strawbridge v. Curtiss. 33 While some of this confusion has been resolved
through judicial interpretation and Congressional legislation, the method of
detennining whether the litigation exceeds the jurisdictional threshold
remains a conflict among the circuit courts that has lingered for over a
century.34 To date, the Supreme Court has yet to adopt a uniforn rule for
federal courts to apply in making this detennination.35
27 See HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 786 (2d ed. 1973) (discussing various bases argued for diversity jurisdiction).
29 See id. (arguing amount in controversy requirement protected defendants from traveling
far to defend small claims).
2,)See Note, FederalJurisdictionalAmount: Determinationof the Matter in Controversy, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1960) (discussing other historical justifications for diversity
jurisdiction).
30 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("[I]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
31 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12 (allowing either party or court to raise issue of subject matter
jurisdiction).
3,2 See, Deutsch v. Hewes St. Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1966) (discussing
difficulty in determining amount in controversy at outset of case).
33 7 U.S. 267, 267-68 (1806) (establishing complete diversity rule).
34 Compare Anderson v. Moorer, 372 F.2d 747, 750 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding res judicata
defense could not defeat diversity jurisdiction), with Jimenez-Puig v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 574
F.2d 37, 40 (Ist Cir. 1978) (holding plaintiffs good faith claim not controlling when, viewed
objectively, could not exceed jurisdictional amount).
35 See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversitv Actions When the Amount in
Controversi Cannot he Determined from the Face of Plaintiff"s Complaint: The Need .or
Judicial and Statutory Reform to PreserveDefendant's Equal Access to FederalCourts, 62 Mo.

L. REV. 681, 685 (1997) (discussing confusion among federal courts in determining amount in
controversy).
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Since the enactment of Section 1332, the Court repeatedly has
addressed the difficulty in determining whether the cause of action exceeds
the amount in controversy, and has provided some guidelines for analyzing
the issue. 6 In Mississippi & Missouri Railroad Co. v. Ward, 7 the Court
faced the question of whether the cause of action satisfied the jurisdictional
amount where the relief sought was injunctive rather than monetary. 38 In
Ward, the plaintiff steamboat owner sought an abatement of a bridge that
he argued was a nuisance. 3 9 The Court concluded that to determine
whether the action seeking injunctive relief exceeded the amount in
controversy, "the value of the object must govern. 4 ° Without any further
substantive analysis as to what it meant by the "value of the object,"
however, the Ward Court provided4 little guidance for future determinations
1
of amount in controversy disputes.
The seminal Supreme Court decision concerning the amount in
controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction came down in 1938 in
Red Cab, nearly eight decades after the Court decided Ward.4 2 In Red Cab,
the respondent, an Indiana corporation, contracted with the petitioner, a
Minnesota corporation, whereby the petitioner agreed to insure against
losses or expenses incurred for claims of compensation for a thirty-day
period.43 The original complaint sought $4000 in damages, but after the
defendant removed the case to federal court the plaintiff filed an amended
complaint with an exhibit attached listing injuries totaling approximately
one-third of that amount. 44 The District Court found for the plaintiff in the
amount of $1162.98, but on appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals for the

36 See Mississippi & Missouri R.R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485, 492 (1862) (announcing
"value of the object" test).
37 67 U.S. 485 (1862).
3X Id. at 492 (discussing difficulty of assessing monetary amount to injunctive relief prayed).
3) Id. at 491 (detailing facts giving rise to nuisance action). The bridge in dispute extended
over the Mississippi River, and the plaintiff alleged that it interrupted the navigation of the river,
which was "a necessity of trade, and almost the only means of transportation between Wisconsin,
Northern Iowa, Minnesota, and the upper Mississippi." Id. at 487. The plaintiff further alleged
that several of his boats had been damaged because of the rapid current caused by the erection of
the bridge at that particular point on the river, and that he had to pay higher insurance premiums
because of the risk caused by the bridge. Id.
40 Id.at 492 (adopting "value of the object" test).
41 See id (failing to further explain "value of object" test).
42 See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) (announcing "legal
certainty" test).
43 Id. at 284 (explaining terms of contract in dispute).
44 Id. at 285 (detailing facts of case). The amended complaint still sought $4000 in damages,
even though the exhibit listed a lesser amount. Id. in 1937, the amount in controversy
requirement for diversity jurisdiction was $3000. Act of March 3, 1911 § 24, 36 Stat. 1087,
1091.
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Seventh Circuit remanded to the state court for want of jurisdiction because
the claims on the record did not satisfy the amount in controversy. 45 In
reversing the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court held that where the
plaintiffs claim is made in good faith, "it must appear to a legal certainty
that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify
dismissal. 4 6 The Court reasoned that the respondent had a good faith
claim on the face of the pleadings to invoke federal jurisdiction, and a
subsequent reduction after initial filing did not eliminate that jurisdiction.47
II. THE CURRENT COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RED
CAB STANDARD AMONG THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
While the "legal certainty" test adopted in Red Cab is seemingly
straightforward in its language, it has proven markedly convoluted in its
application among the circuit courts.48 Circuit courts of appeals continually
have struggled with which viewpoint is controlling in the litigation, and
three further approaches have developed: the "plaintiff-viewpoint"
approach, the "either-party" approach, and the "party-invoking
jurisdiction" approach. 49 Under the plaintiff-viewpoint approach, which
was essentially the approach taken by the Red Cab Court, courts look only
to the plaintiffs complaint. 50 Courts following the "either-party" approach
look to see if either the plaintiffs requested recovery or the defendant's
potential cost to comply therewith exceeds the monetary threshold.5"
Finally, a small number of courts following the "party-invoking
jurisdiction" approach look only to the interest of the party invoking federal
jurisdiction, either to the plaintiff's filing in federal court or to the
removal to federal court, to see if the jurisdictional threshold is
defendant's
52
satisfied.

45 See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 90 F.2d 229, 230 (7th Cir. 1937)
(remanding to state court for lack of diversity jurisdiction), rev'd, 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
46 Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 288-89 (establishing "legal certainty" test).
47 See id at 296 (holding that initial good faith claim controls).
48 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, § 5.3 (discussing different approaches taken by federal
courts in diversity cases).
49 See generally Evan A. Creutz, Note, Two Sides to Ever Story: Measuring the
,
Jurisdictional Amount in Federal Courts, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1719, 1726-34 (2000)
(discussing evolution of three competing viewpoints).
5 See Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 288-89 (holding plaintiffs good faith claim determines whether
jurisdiction exists).
51 See McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1979) (applying "eitherparty" approach in upholding diversity jurisdiction).
52 See Panama Transport Co. v. Greenberg, 290 F.2d 125, 126 (1st Cir. 1961) (applying
"party-invoking jurisdiction" approach in dismissing for lack ofjurisdiction).
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The competing interpretations of the Red Cab decision have led to
a further split among the circuit courts regarding the extent to which courts
should consider factors beyond the plaintiffs good faith pleading.53
Specifically, there is disagreement as to whether a court sitting in diversity
should consider an affirmative defense in the pleadings which, if valid,
would defeat diversity jurisdiction.5 4 To this end, the circuit courts have

taken two distinct positions: the minority approach, proponents of which
generally do not consider affirmative defenses in ascertaining whether
diversity jurisdiction exists; and the majority approach, proponents of
which look beyond the pleadings to determine whether jurisdiction is

proper.55
A. The Minority Approach
Federal courts following the minority approach have applied the
Red Cab standard strictly and have held that only the plaintiffs claim
controls.56 The 1967 Fifth Circuit case of Anderson v. Moorer5 7 is an early
illustration of the minority approach.58 In Anderson, the plaintiff owned

certain freehold and leasehold interests in mineral land in Alabama
pursuant to a decree of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama.59
The plaintiff then brought suit in federal court, claiming that she was
entitled to a larger share than she had received from the Alabama court
decree. 60

The defendants sought to dismiss the case on jurisdictional

grounds, arguing that the Alabama decree was res judicata and therefore
the plaintiffs claim could not exceed the monetary threshold even though

53 Compare Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., 802 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir.
1986) (dismissing diversity suit for want ofjurisdiction because statute limited recovery to $750),
with Zacharia v. Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 684 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 1982) (declining to consider
affirmative defense that statute limited recovery to $1000 for jurisdictional determination).
54 See Anderson v. Moorer, 372 F.2d 747, 750 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding res judicata defense
could not defeat amount in controversy if satisfied in plaintiffs pleading).
55 See id. (providing illustration of the minority approach); see also City of Boulder v.
Snyder, 396 F.2d 853, 856 (10th Cir. 1968) (providing illustration of majority approach).
56 See, e.g., Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 347 F.3d 394, 397 (2d
Cir. 2003) (refusing to consider pleaded defense of preclusion in determining amount in
controversy); Ochoa v. Interbrew Am., Inc., 999 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1993) (asserting valid
defense disclosed in complaint not considered in determining if amount in controversy satisfied);
Deutsch v. Hewes St. Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding tort claim for
unliquidated damages did not justify dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction).
57 372 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1967).
58 See id at 750 (holding res judicata defense could not defeat amount in controversy if
satisfied in plaintiff's pleading).
59 Id at 749 (discussing background of case).
60 See id. (detailing plaintiffs claim for additional damages).
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she had claimed more than $10,000.61 The Fifth Circuit upheld jurisdiction
over the matter, asserting that "the probability of a valid factual defense...

is not sufficient to diminish the amount in controversy and to oust the court
of jurisdiction, even if that defense appears on the face of the complaint. 62
Courts following the minority approach also apply the "legal
certainty" test liberally when encountering a case for unliquidated
damages. 63 These courts, however, will still dismiss a cause of action for
lack of jurisdiction if, during the course of the litigation, it becomes readily
apparent that the plaintiff's claim could not have exceeded the threshold.6 4
While these interpretations might appear inconsistent on the surface, they
are distinguishable.65 In a case for unliquidated damages, courts following
the minority approach will not dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.66 The
rationale for conferring jurisdiction in such a case is that a dismissal would
amount to a judicial finding as to what damages the plaintiff could recover,
thereby invading the province of the jury.67 In a diversity case where the

",i d. at 750. In 1967, the amount in controversy threshold was $10,000. Act of July 25,
1958, 72 Stat. 415-416.
62 Anderson v. Moorer, 372 F.2d 747, 750 (5th Cir. 1967).
61 Set, Deutsch v. Hewes St. Realty Corp., 359 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding diversity
jurisdiction in tort action for unliquidated claim). In Deutsch, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals faced precisely this issue when the plaintiff brought a negligence action against the
defendant corporation seeking to recover $25,000 for personal injuries. Id. at 97. In its answer,
the defendant denied that the plaintiffs damages exceeded $10,000, which was the statutory
minimum at that time for diversity actions, and moved to dismiss the action. Id. at 98. The
district judge dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, stating that there was a "remote
unlikely possibility that a jury would return a verdict in the amount of$10,000 or more ..... Id.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district judge could not attempt to
predetermine the value of an unliquidated damages claim, and therefore federal diversity
jurisdiction was proper. Id. at 100.
64 See Tongkook Am., Inc. v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 785 (3d Cir. 1994)
(dismissing for lack ofjurisdiction when discovery revealed amount in controversy not satisfied).
In Tongkook, a clothing manufacturer brought a breach of contract claim against one of its
distributors, initially alleging damages of more than $ 100,000. Id. at 782. During discovery,
however, the parties determined that the actual amount in controversy was below the statutory
threshold. Id. at 785. The district court concluded that jurisdiction was proper because the parties
believed that the dispute exceeded the threshold amount at the time of filing. Id. at 783. On
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that because discovery revealed that the claim was
for less than the jurisdictional amount, "'Tongkook could not properly claim the required statutory
jurisdictional amount, and this was true when the action was commenced .... " Id at 785.
65 See Tongkook, 14 F.3d at 785 (distinguishing fact pattern in Deutsch from fact pattern in
Tongkook).
66 See Deutsch, 359 F.2d at 100 (asserting unliquidated damages difficult for judge to
quantify).
67 See id. (reasoning "to allow a district court judge to value a plaintiff's claim in a case
which involves a demand for unliquidated damages and in which the jurisdictional issue is
inextricably bound up with the merits of the controversy is tantamount to depriving the plaintiff
of his present statutory right to a jury trial").
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parties ascertain the actual amount of damages incurred prior to trial,
however, courts will dismiss because the plaintiffs claim never could have
exceeded the statutory threshold. 68 Thus, while a court following the
minority approach will look only to the plaintiffs claim to determine
whether it exceeds the statutory amount, it will still dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction
if the pre-trial record demonstrates that the amount is
69
not satisfied.

B. The Majority Approach
Under the majority approach, federal courts look beyond the
pleadings and instead focus more closely on the underlying cause of action
to determine if the amount in controversy indeed exceeds the statutory
threshold. 7° The conservative nature of this approach emerged in City of
Boulder v. Snyder.7 1 The plaintiff in Snyder sought damages against the
City of Boulder, Colorado for the governmental taking of certain water
rights caused by a street-paving project. 72 The plaintiff sought damages of

$25,000 in her complaint, and the district judge held diversity jurisdiction
to be proper.73 At trial, the plaintiff testified to damages of $13,500, but
five expert witnesses testified that her damages were significantly less than
this amount.74 On appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the
Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court to dismiss on the
grounds that, in light of the testimony 7at5 trial, the plaintiff never could have
recovered above the threshold amount.
,8 See Tongkook, 14 F.3d at 785 (discussing reasoning for dismissal on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction).
69 Id. (stating determination of amount below statutory requirement during discovery
justified dismissal).
70 See, e.g., Pratt Cent. Park Ltd. P'ship v. Dames & Moore, Inc., 60 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir.
1995) (dismissing claim where contractual provision limited recovery below statutory threshold);
Jimenez-Puig v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 574 F.2d 37, 40 (lst Cir. 1978) (finding no basis for
punitive damages claimed and therefore amount in controversy not satisfied); City of Boulder v.
Snyder, 396 F.2d 853, 857 (10th Cir. 1968) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction when expert
testimony at trial suggested action did not exceed statutory amount).
71 396 F.2d 853, 857 (10th Cir. 1968) (holding jurisdiction improper when evidence at trial
demonstrated potential recovery below threshold amount).
72 See id. at 855 (discussing nature of taking claim). The paving project extended in front of
the plaintiffs residence, and caused the destruction of a waterway that abutted and served her
property. Id. Several others similarly situated joined the plaintiff, alleging the same damages.
Id.
73 See id. (finding jurisdiction based on plaintiff s good faith claim).
74 Id. at 856 (detailing testimony of witnesses of damages). While the opinions of the experts
differed as to the amount of actual damages, the highest opinion assessed the total damages
suffered by the plaintiffs at $3000. Id.
75 See id. at 857 (remanding with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction).

88

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XIV

The Snyder case is representative of the majority trend of
rigorously analyzing diversity cases to determine whether federal
jurisdiction is proper.76 Courts following the majority approach consider
affirmative defenses to a plaintiffs claims, other defenses stated in a
plaintiffs complaint, and statutory or contractual limitations to recovery.77
Moreover, even when a case goes to trial, these federal courts are more
likely to continue to examine rigorously a plaintiffs claims, and to dismiss
if the evidence indicates that the amount in controversy could not have
satisfied the jurisdictional threshold at the commencement of the action. 78
C. The Irreconcilabilityof the Minority and Majority Approaches: An
Illustration
The Second Circuit case Zacharia v. HarborIsland Spa, Inc. 79 and
the Ninth Circuit case Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas °

illustrate the incompatibility of the majority and minority views. These
cases both involved a breach of contract claim in which state law expressly
limited the recovery to an amount below the jurisdictional threshold. 1 In
Zacharia, the plaintiff sued the Harbor Island Spa Hotel in federal court

when valuables were stolen from one of the hotel safety deposit boxes that
she had rented. 82 When she rented the box, however, she had signed a
"Statement of Value" card which stated that the renter waived "any claim
against said hotel, its agents, servants and employees, in excess of One
Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars".8 3 The district court, relying on this

76 See id. at 856 (analyzing witness testimony as basis for dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction).
77 See, e.g., Delvecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 230 F.3d 974, 980 (7th Cir. 2000) (dismissing on
grounds that ratio of punitive damages to actual damages was excessive); Adams v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (asserting "open-ended prayer for
recovery ... is not an allegation that diversity jurisdiction exists"); Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel,
58 F.3d 1215, 1218 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding plaintiff must have "competent proof' to justify
diversity jurisdiction).
78 See Jiminez-Puig v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 574 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding
jurisdiction improper when plaintiffs claim, objectively viewed, could not exceed jurisdictional
amount).
79 684 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1982).
80 802 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1986).
81 See Pachinger, 802 F.2d at 365 (involving statutory limitation on recovery of $750);

Zacharia,684 F.2d at 202 (involving statutory limitation on recovery of $1000). In both cases,
the petitioners were challenging the validity of the contractual provisions limiting the liability of
the respondents. See Pachinger,802 F.2d at 365; Zacharia,684 F.2d at 202.
82 Zacharia,684 F.2d at 200-01 (discussing facts of case).
83 Id. at 201 n. 1 (outlining terms of safe deposit box agreement).
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contract provision, dismissed sua sponte for want of jurisdiction. 4

On

appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a district judge could not
consider a defense on the merits in determining if the cause of action
exceeded the statutory threshold and remanded the case to the lower federal
court.8"
The facts of the Pachinger case were remarkably similar to the
facts of Zacharia, yet the court reached a contrary result.8 6 In Pachinger,
the plaintiff, a jewelry salesman, gave some jewelry to the bellhop at the
MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas to place in a safe deposit box.87 The
bellhop, in exchange, gave him a claim check which stated that MGM's
liability was limited to $250." Some of the jewelry disappeared and
Pachinger brought a diversity action against the hotel alleging the missing
jewelry had a value of $19,000.89 The hotel moved to dismiss on the
grounds that Nevada state law, which controlled the action, limited MGM's
liability to $750, which was well below the statutory threshold for diversity
jurisdiction. ° Agreeing with MGM that the statute limited Pachinger's
recovery to $750, the district judge dismissed the case, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed on the same grounds. 9'

I1. A PROPOSAL FOR SOLVING THE CURRENT CIRCUIT COURT
SPLIT
The pro-plaintiff minority approach and the more stringent
majority approach are inconsistent and irreconcilable.92 There is, however,
a relatively modest compromise that could end the split among the circuits
while still ensuring that the Red Cab standard remains the starting point in
all federal diversity cases. This Note proposes a solution based on a twopart analysis: first, a determination of whether the plaintiffs claim, viewed
84 See id. at 202 (dismissing on grounds that liability was limited by statute to $1000).
85 See id. at 203 (declining to consider state statutory limitation on recovery in amount in
controversy determination).
86 See Pachinger,802 F.2d at 365 (dismissing for lack ofjurisdiction because statute limited
recovery to $750).
87 Id. at 363 (outlining facts of case).
88 Id. (detailing limitation of liability in hotel claim check).
89 Id. (discussing plaintiffs claim for damages). In 1986, the amount in controversy
requirement for diversity jurisdiction was $10,000. Act of July 25, 1958, 72 Stat. 415.
90 Pachinger, 802 F.2d at 363 (discussing Nevada statute that limited innkeeper liability to
S750).

91 See id. at 365 (affirming district court dismissal for lack of diversity jurisdiction because
amount in controversy not satisfied).
92 See supra Part II(C) (demonstrating inconsistency of circuit split).
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objectively, is for an amount that could exceed the jurisdictional threshold;
and second, whether satisfaction of the jurisdictional amount depends on
the enforceability of a state statutory or contractual limitation on
93
recovery.
The first part of the analysis is a relatively straightforward
application of the Red Cab standard: whether the plaintiffs good faith
claim is for an amount that could exceed the statutory threshold.9 4
Consistent with the "legal certainty" test, this initial analysis should be
fairly liberal, allowing a plaintiff access to federal courts so long as it
appears possible that he could recover an amount that exceeds the
jurisdictional threshold.99 The notice pleading system under which96 our
judicial system operates warrants a liberal application of this standard.
Presumably, courts that apply the majority approach initially might
object to this liberal approach as opening the federal courts to numerous
trivial claims, thus overloading the federal courts' dockets. 97 This concern,
while warranted, is alleviated somewhat by the provisions of the diversity
statute allowing for the denial of costs to plaintiffs who recover less than
the jurisdictional amount.98 Moreover, the statute also grants federal courts
the discretion to impose costs on plaintiffs in such cases. 99 With this
93 See Pachinger, 802 F.2d at 363 (dismissing case where outcome depended on
enforceability of state statutory limitation); see also Zacharia, 684 F.2d at 202 (holding
jurisdiction proper even though dispute grounded in enforceability of state statute).
94 See St. Paul Mercury Inden. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938) (explaining
"legal certainty" test).
95 See id. at 288-89 (asserting that "sum of plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made
in good faith"): see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &

PROCEDURE § 3702 (3d ed. 1998) ("[E]ven when the complaint discloses a valid defense to the
plaintiffs action, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls, since the defendant may not assert
that defense or may not ultimately prevail on it.").
96 See FED. R. CIv. P. 8 (outlining notice pleading requirements): see also Red Cab, 303 U.S.
at 289 (noting that courts should determine jurisdictional amount "from the face of the
pleadings").
97 See Pratt Cent. Park Ltd. P'ship v. Dames & Moore, Inc., 60 F.3d 350, 352 (7th Cir. 1995)
(stressing liberal standard would "attract new claimants for the limited time and resources of the
federal bench").
98 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (2005). This provision of the statute reads as follows:
Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute
of the United States, where the plaintiff who files the case originally
in the Federal courts is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less
than the sum or value of $75,000, computed without regard to any
setoff or counterclaim to which the defendant may be adjudged to be
entitled, and exclusive of interest and costs, the district court may deny
costs to the plaintiffand, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (2006).
99 See id. (granting district court authority to deny costs to plaintiff or impose costs on
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potential for additional costs, plaintiffs presumably will be hesitant to bring
a diversity action where the amount sought is uncertain or unlikely to
exceed the jurisdictional threshold. 0(
Moreover, the initial liberal analysis applies only to those actions
which assert a claim that, viewed objectively, could exceed the statutory
amount. 10 To be sure, many lawsuits brought in diversity do not satisfy
this objective standard. 10 2 For these more questionable cases, the analysis
should proceed a step further to determine the nature of the underlying
claim.1 0 3 Such a situation arises in cases like Pachinger and Zacharia,
where the determination of whether the lawsuit exceeds the amount in
controversy depends on the court's determination at trial of the
10 4
enforceability of a state statutory or contractual limitation on damages.
In such cases, federal courts should dismiss these causes of action for lack
of jurisdiction, notwithstanding whether the court might find the statutory
or contractual limitation unenforceable. 0 5 Rather than try to predict
whether a particular state's highest court would find the limitation on
damages enforceable or unenforceable, a sound solution in such a case is to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and let the parties litigate the action in state
ruling would then guide federal courts
court. ' 6 The resulting state court
07
future.1
the
in
diversity
in
sitting
While this two-part analysis potentially would solve the
inconsistencies in cases involving the enforceability of state statutory or
contractual limitations, there remains the question as to what extent federal
08
courts should consider other affirmative defenses raised in the pleadings.
plaintiff).
oo See Jordan F. Miller Corp. v. Mid-Continent Aircraft Serv., Inc., 1999 WL 164955, at *3
(lOth Cir. March 24, 1999) ("We recognize that the legislative history of § 1332(b) demonstrates
an intent to deter plaintiffs from filing cases in federal court when the amount in controversy is,
or is likely to be. less than the jurisdictional amount.").
101 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing "legal certainty" test).
102 See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text (describing difficulty in determining
whether jurisdictional amount satisfied at outset of litigation).
101 See i/i a notes 105-115 and accompanying text (explaining proposed two-fold analysis
for detennining whether amount in controversy satisfied).
104 See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
105 See Pratt Cent. Park Ltd. P'ship v. Dames & Moore, Inc., 60 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir.
1995) (asserting "district judge possesses the power to eject a case when a contract holds damages
below the jurisdictional amount").
Federal
106 See Crawford v. Martin Marietta Corp., 622 F.2d 339, 341 (8th Cir. 1980) .
courts arc not to overrule settled state law and predict that a state court would do so without
strong indications from the state itself.").
1o See id. (asserting state court should decide whether to overrule settled state court
precedent).
108 See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing varying approaches to whether
courts should consider affirmative defenses in pleadings when determining jurisdictional
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In such cases, this Note proposes that federal courts should analyze the
plaintiffs claim solely under the Red Cab "legal certainty" test, and not
look to potential affirmative defenses. 10 9 This Note argues that this rule
should apply even if the plaintiff asserts the existence of a potential
affirmative defense in his complaint. 0

One rationale for federal courts sitting in diversity to disregard
these affirmative defenses in determining whether subject matter
jurisdiction is present is that many affirmative defenses are waiveable."'

As such, a court cannot determine from the initial filing of the complaint
whether the defendant will plead the defense in its answer.'

12

Moreover,

and perhaps a more practical rationale for this approach, is that the mere
existence of an affirmative defense, either in a complaint or an answer,
does not guarantee that the plaintiffs claim will fail.'

3

Indeed, as one

circuit court noted, if such defenses were considered in determining the
jurisdictional

amount,

"doubt

and

ambiguity

would

surround

the

jurisdictional base of most diversity litigation from complaint to final
judgment, and issues going to a federal court's power to decide would be
hopelessly confused with the merits themselves." '"

4

Thus, to consider

these affirmative defenses in determining whether the jurisdictional
threshold has been met would violate the Red Cab principle that the value

of the claim must be ascertained "from the face of the pleadings.""

5

CONCLUSION

The limited jurisdiction of federal courts is a central component of
the American judicial system, and thus courts should scrutinize closely

assertions of and challenges to subject matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
the murkiness surrounding diversity jurisdiction and the amount in
amount).
109 See Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 347 F.3d 394, 397 (2d Cir.
2003) (asserting "affirmative defenses ... on the merits may not be used to whittle down the
amount in controversy" (internal quotations omitted)).
11o See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938) ("Nor
does the fact that the complaint discloses the existence of a valid defense [defeat jurisdiction].").
111 See Scherer, 347 F.3d at 399 (holding use of res judicata to reduce amount in controversy
impermissible because defense waivable).
112 See Pratt Central Park Ltd. P'Ship v. Dames & Moore, Inc., 60 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir.
1995) (Flaum, J., dissenting) ("yet the fact of a defense, and a good defense, too, would not affect
the question as to what was the amount in dispute").
13 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
114 Zacharia v. Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 684 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 1982).
l See Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 289 (holding amount in controversy determined on basis of
pleadings).
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controversy requirement can often cloud the jurisdictional question. To
that end, clear guidelines and uniformity in their application among the
circuits is necessary to ensure consistency in diversity jurisdiction
determinations. Adopting the analytical approach proposed in this Note is
one step toward ensuring consistency among the circuits, and potentially
could resolve the current split regarding the limits of diversity jurisdiction.
A more consistent application of these principles would make jurisdictional
determinations more predictable for the federal bar, and would encourage
attorneys to analyze rigorously the grounds for diversity jurisdiction before
filing a case in federal court.
Robert A. Hurstak

